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The plaintiff/appellant, Jonathon Jones, pursuant to Rule 
24(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, submits the 
following Brief. 
JURISDICTION 
This appeal was originally filed with the Utah Supreme Court 
but, on December 24, 1992, was poured-over by that Court to the 
Utah Court of Appeals. This Court has jurisdiction to decide this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-2 (h). This is an appeal 
from a final Order of Dismissal of the Third Judicial District 
Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer Wilkinson presiding. The Order of Dismissal entered by the 
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant and 
dismissed the plaintiff's claims as against the defendant with 
prejudice. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE 
The following issues are presented to this court for review: 
1. Did the court err in ruling that the Plaintiff's claim is 
barred by the Doctrine of Assumption of the Risk or should the 
issue be decided by the jury? 
2. Did the court err in ruling that the plaintiff's claim is 
barred because the defendant did not intend to injure the plaintiff 
or is such a question of fact to be decided by the jury? 
3. Did the court err in ruling that the plaintiff's claim is 
barred because the defendant did not violate any safety rule? 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY AUTHORITY 
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-37, (1953), as amended; 
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Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38, (1953), as amended. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an action for reckless, intentional and negligent 
conduct against the defendant, which conduct in the course of a 
softball game, caused injury to the plaintiff. 
B. Course of Proceedings. 
After some discovery, and a Motion for Summary Judgment by the 
defendant, the lower court granted the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment and dismissed the plaintiff's claim. No oral 
argument was heard by the trial court on the defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
C. Statement of Facts. 
1. Appellant was the first batter in an amateur L.D.S. church 
softball game. 
2. Appellant hit the first ball softly into the infield 
towards the pitchers mound. 
3. Appellee, who was playing second base on the opposing team, 
relaxed when he saw the ball hit towards the pitcher but, when the 
ball rolled between the pitchers legs, ran towards the ball, caught 
it barehanded with his right hand and threw it sidearm to first 
base. 
4. The ball was thrown wide of the first baseman and struck 
the appellant on the left side of his face when the appellant was 
past first base. 
5. It is disputed as to how far beyond the first base bag the 
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appellant was when he was struck by the ball. 
6* As a result of the blow to his face by the ball, the 
appellant suffered severe fractures of his facial bones and the 
orbit of his left eyef resulting in permanent blindness in his left 
eye. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The defendant's reckless or negligent conduct caused injury to 
the plaintiff. The plaintiff's assumption of the risk, if any, in 
playing Softball, does not preclude his being awarded damages 
against the defendant, but merely is a factor for the trier of fact 
to take into consideration when apportioning negligence. 
Similarly, the fact that the defendant may not have acted 
intentionally in injuring the plaintiff or may not violated a 
safety rule while playing the game likewise does not preclude the 
plaintiff from proving that the defendant was negligent. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED 
BY THE DOCTRINE OF "ASSUMPTION 
OF RISK" 
Utah Code Annotated §§78-27-37 and -38 (1953) , as amended, are 
the two statutes which codify Utah's comparative negligence 
standards. In U.C.A. §78-27-37 (2), "fault" is defined as meaning 
"any actionable breach of legal duty, act or omission proximately 
causing or contributing to injury or damages sustained by a person 
seeking recovery, including, but not limited to, negligence in all 
its degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of risk . • ." 
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(Emphasis added). U.C.A. §78-27-38 states that "The fault of a 
person seeking recovery shall not alone bar recovery by that 
person." (Emphasis added). 
In his memorandum to the trial court, the defendant/appellee 
claimed that the doctrine of "assumption of the risk" acts as a 
complete bar to the plaintiff/appellant. However, in Jacobsen 
Construction v. Structo-Lite Engineering. 619 P.2d 306 (Utah 1980), 
the Utah Supreme Court stated that: 
Under the circumstances in this case, the term 
"assumption of the risk" meant the voluntary, yet 
unreasonable, encounter of a known, appreciated 
risk. The complete bar to recovery which such 
conduct once constituted in a negligence action 
has been abolished by the Utah comparative neg-
ligence statute to avoid the harshness visited 
upon plaintiffs as a result of the all-or-nothing 
nature of the former rule of law. 
Id. at 309 (Emphasis added) 
At the trial court, the appellee cited the Utah case of Moore 
v. Burton Lumber & Hardware Co., 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981), as his 
authority for the proposition that "assumption of the risk" is a 
complete bar to a plaintiffs recovery. However, in Moore, the Utah 
Supreme Court stated that: 
The complete bar to recovery in an action for 
negligence, which assumption of the risk has 
been historically, has been lifted by the Utah 
comparative negligence statute to avoid the 
harshness visited upon plaintiffs as a result 
of the all-or-nothing nature of the former 
rule of law. 
Id. at 878 (Emphasis added) 
The appellee, and the trial court, misread and misapplied 
Moore. Instead of a complete bar to a plaintiff's recovery, 
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assumption of the risk is merely one factor that the trier of fact 
takes into account when determining comparative negligence on a 
special verdict form. 
Utah's Comparative Negligence statute (U.C.A. §78-27-38) makes 
clear that any assumption of the risk by the plaintiff does not 
completely bar that person's recovery. In any event, the fault of 
one of the parties is an issue for the trier of fact to determine. 
The trial court erred in granting Summary Judgment to the 
appellee on the grounds that assumption of the risk is a complete 
bar to a plaintiff's claim. It simply is not a complete bar, but 
just one factor for the trier of fact to take into account during 
its deliberations on comparative fault. 
POINT II 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED 
EVEN THOUGH THE APPELLEE MAY NOT 
HAVE INTENDED AN INJURY TO THE 
APPELLANT 
In his memorandum to the trial court, the appellee claimed 
that, because he did not intend to harm the appellant, the 
appellants claim should be barred. While the appellee is correct 
in his assertion that "some courts have held than an injury 
inflicted in the course of an athletic competition can be 
maintained if a participant intentionally injures an opponent", the 
courts have also held that the plaintiff may maintain an action if 
the defendants conduct is deliberate, willful or done with a 
reckless disregard for the safety of other players. At the trial 
court, the defendant relied upon the Illinois Court of Appeals case 
of Naboznv v. Barnhill, 334 N.E. 2d 258 (111. App. 1975), in 
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support of his position. 
In Naboznv, the plaintiff was injured when kicked in the head 
by an opposing player during a soccer game. At the end of the 
plaintiff's case, the court granted the defendant's motion for a 
directed verdict. The plaintiff appealed, contending that the 
trial court had erred in granting the directed verdict and that the 
plaintiff's participation in the game did not prohibit the 
establishment of a prima facie case of negligence. In overturning 
the trial court, the Illinois Court of Appeals stated that: 
It is our opinion that a player is liable for 
injury in a tort action if his conduct is such 
that it is either deliberate, willful or with a 
reckless disregard to the safety of the other 
player so as to cause injury to that player, the 
same being a question of fact to be decided by a 
jury-
Id. at 261. (Emphasis added) 
Accordingly, whether or not the defendant was acting 
deliberately, willfully or with a reckless disregard for the safety 
of the plaintiff is a question for the trier of fact to decide. 
The trial court erred in granting appellee's Motion for Summary 
Judgment based on this theory. 
POINT III 
APPELLANT'S CLAIM IS NOT BARRED BECAUSE 
THE APPELLEE MAY NOT HAVE VIOLATED A 
SAFETY RULE 
Appellee claims that, because he may not have violated a 
safety rule, the appellants claim is barred. However, the case 
cited by the appellee to the trial court, Nabozny, supra, does not 
stand for that proposition. 
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Nabozny says that the violation of a safety rule may be the 
basis of a claim, not that the non-violation of a safety rule bars 
such a claim. That is, it does not stand for the proposition that 
a violation of a safety rule by a plaintiff is required for a 
plaintiff to be able to maintain a claim in a sports case. The 
appellee and the trial court misread and misapplied Naboznv on the 
issue of whether or not a violation of a safety rule is required in 
order for a plaintiff to maintain a cause of action in a sports 
related accident. 
In any event, there is no evidence in the record which 
supports the appellees position that he did not violate a safety 
rule. 
The trial court erred in granting appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment based on the fact that the appellee had not 
violated some safety rule. 
In the absence of case law to the contrary, the appellant 
should be able to maintain a cause of action even if there has been 
no violation of a safety rule by the appellee. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should reverse the trial court's Summary Judgment 
in favor of the appellee and remand the case for reinstatement of 
the appellee's cause of action. 
DATED this \Jn day of March, 1993. 
GOICOECHEA LAW OFFICE - WEST VALLEY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
By: S ^^^ ^ 
LEONARD E. McGEE 
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Utah Code Annotated §78-27-37, (1953), as amended 
Definitions 
As used in §§ 78-27-37 through 78-27-43: 
(1) "Defendant" means any person not immune from suit who 
is claimed to be liable because of fault to any person 
seeking recovery. 
(2) "Fault" means any actionable breach of legal duty, 
act or omission proximately causing or contributing to 
injury or damages sustained by a person seeking recovery, 
including, but not limited to, negligence in all its 
degrees, contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, 
strict liability, breach of express or implied warranty 
of a product, products liability, and misuse, 
modification or abuse of a product. 
(3) "Person seeking recovery" means any person seeking 
damages or reimbursement on its own behalf, or on behalf 
of another for whom it is authorized to act as legal 
representative. 
Utah Code Annotated §78-27-38, (1953), as amended 
Comparative Negligence 
The fault of a person seeking recovery shall not alone 
bar recovery by that person. He may recover from any 
defendant or group of defendants whose fault exceeds his 
own. However, no defendant is liable to any person 
seeking recovery for any amount in excess of the 
proportion of fault attributable to that defendant. 
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